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Abstract. In the United States, “populist” is a controversial and often misunderstood signifier in 
common discourse. In addition, the current state of mass media and introduction of social networking 
tools has created a hyper-partisan spectacle of politics – especially during presidential campaign 
seasons. Through the review of literature on populism, traditional and social media, and presidential 
campaigning in the United States, this article constructs a new view on the relationship between these 
three topics in the 21st century. Important steps in this article’s process include defining populism and 
its place within campaigning and media; presenting social media as a political tool and a dynamic 
personalized informer; and analyzing the US presidential elections since 2008. Resultantly, because the 
trends of online activity, on the part of both the citizen and the candidate, impact social media users’ 
self-informing and political engagement, the process of selecting a new US president has become more 
susceptible to various populist practices in this century than before.
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[es] Los Papeles de las redes sociales en el populismo del siglo 21: campañas 
presidenciales estadounidenses
Resumen. En el discurso de los Estados Unidos «populista» es un significante polémico y a menudo no 
entendido. Además, se ha creado un espectáculo muy parcial de la política debido al estado actual de 
los medios masivos y a la introducción de las redes sociales. A través del análisis de literaturas sobre el 
populismo, los medios tradicionales y sociales y la campaña presidencial de los Estados Unidos, se 
construye en este artículo una nueva interpretación sobre la relación entre estos tres temas en el siglo 
XXI. Las etapas analizadas incluyen la definición del populismo y su posición con respecto a la campaña 
y a los medios; la presentación de las redes sociales como herramientas políticas e informantes 
personalizados dinámicos; y analizar las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses desde 2008. Por 
ello, argumento que debido a que las tendencias de las actividades en línea, por parte del ciudadano y 
del candidato, afectan a las habilidades de los usuarios de las redes sociales para informarse y participar 
en la política, el proceso de elegir un nuevo presidente de los Estados Unidos se ha vuelto más propenso 
a varias prácticas populistas en este siglo que antes. 
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1. Introduction
Contemporary politics are characterized by their relationship with social media. 
Since the early to mid 20th century, technological advancements in media have been 
harnessed by various politicians to their advantage. More recently, a partisan mass 
media and now the introduction of social networking applications have become the 
standard, all of which create a political spectacle to be consumed. I discuss how 
this (social) media spectacle relates to populism in the 21st century, specifically to 
the “Trump phenomenon” in a context of its own relation to the Obama campaigns. 
This discussion further proposes whether instances of populism may have a unique 
propensity to garner undue support and success in this century, in part as a result of 
developing trends among the usage of social media.
Through the analyses of Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield’s (2003) descriptions 
of populist movements and Cass Sunstein’s ideas on the “personalization” of social 
media, I infer that yes, this may be the case. Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield’s 
work was written before the age of social media and the current political climate, 
but by transferring their concepts onto the use of the online in politics, rather than 
(or in addition to) traditional media, the contemporary age of mobilization can be 
understood. Taking from Jody Baumgartner (2017), Stephen Farnsworth (2018), 
and others’ publications, explanations of the methodologies from the past three US 
presidential campaigns serve to reinforce this premise of social media as a necessary, 
or at the least relevant, component of 21st century populisms.
This article presents the intersection of populisms, the unique methods of dis-
course used by both “populist” actors and some traditional politicians alike, and the 
introduction of social media as a political device, as a valid area for future discussion 
and research. This assertion is credited on the presentation of social media as a sa-
lient factor in populist mobilization and on the analysis of the change in how both 
candidates and voters have used social media in campaigns since 2008. By demon-
strating that social media has not only become an integral part of the contemporary 
US presidential campaign but has also evolved to almost cater to populist tactics, 
this article draws attention to the possibility of the campaigns’ susceptibility to 
populisms and a need for further investigation.
When analyzing populist actors or even traditional politicians utilizing populist 
tactics, contemporary literature has mostly viewed the issue as a content of actions 
and discourse with traditional media as the only relay to the people. Both novel and 
established tactics are being utilized; with that being said this article aims to promote 
the inclusion of or primary investigation into social media for future analyses on 
populism and media as the digital tools are now common place. While this article 
focuses solely on social media use during US presidential campaigns, the rise of 
populist actors internationally draws a need for similar analysis on the role played 
by types of social media in those respective campaigns.
2.  Defining populism and its relation to media
To start, populism as a term is often misused or abused and may be difficult to be 
confined to an explicit definition. No consistent attributable ideology exists; from the 
end of WWII towards the turn of the century, populist movements around the globe 
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have gradually moved from left to right-wing positions, with some even claiming 
to be neither (Mazzoleni, Stewart & Horsfield, 2003, p. 4). Themes of opportunism 
or demagogy have been proposed as defining features as well, however this is not 
over-encompassing and could apply to various political campaigns instead. Attempts 
to define populism have rather taken a discursive route, focusing on passions and 
morality, antagonisms and empty signifiers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, pp. 5-6).
An initial definition of this discourse is taken from Ernesto Laclau’s On Populist 
Reason, 2005. Laclau claims “Populism is a discourse that articulates a chain of 
equivalence around an empty signifier and defined by an antagonistic frontier”. Cas 
Mudde further explains this definition as moral politics, the “pure people” versus the 
“corrupt elite”. It is a movement that forms its identity through passion, utilizing a 
charismatic leader who links very different demands as a simple fix through the will 
of the people and who creates the recognition of a common enemy or enemies (2012, 
pp. 5-6).
Now, for the intents and purposes of my paper, I focus solely on populism in the 
21st century (within the US political theatre). By this time, populist movements defi-
nitely adhere to the above definitions. They also begin to be associated with right-
wing positions and are undoubtedly characterized by a “media factor”, as maintained 
by Betz and Immerfall, 1998. Still not yet in the age of social media, the decades 
around the turn of the century contain a conservative-reactionary force that was dis-
tinguished from the fascist right and had especially “media-genic personal qualities”. 
These qualities are “… highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloid style language, com-
bining verbal radicalism and symbolic politics with the tools of contemporary politi-
cal marketing to disseminate their ideas among the electorate” (as cited in Mazzoleni, 
Stewart & Horsfield, 2003, pp. 3-5). These media qualities are populist tactics but 
may indeed still be used by traditional politicians; if the actor is a political outsider, 
revels in controversy, and explicitly utilizes the “them” vs “us” dynamic, he or she 
may be deemed a “populist”.
Further, this media attribute of populism describes how the movements are given 
their momentum through intense coverage by what has become a sensationalized 
mass media. The populist leaders have become irresistible to journalists due to their 
novelty and dramatic flair. Various strategies the populists use to acquire and main-
tain media attention, whether intentional or not, are covered by Mazzoleni, Stewart, 
and Horsfield (2003), and while written before the age of Trump, the parallels are un-
canny. They detail identification as a media “underdog”, usage of unmediated forms 
of communication such as frequent intense rallies (or today the additional use of so-
cial media), and attacks on the media itself. In addition, media outlets often focus on 
the “personalization” frame of issues, especially various behavioral or spoken gaffes 
by populist leaders (2003, p. 230).
Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield outline four phases of the media’s relation-
ship with populist forces. First is the ground-laying step, which is the indirect in-
crease of society’s sense of psychological insecurities. Negative public opinions 
are exacerbated through the sensationalizing of stories for a profit; this allows for 
a populist movement to take advantage of the people’s fears. Next is the insur-
gent phase, when a populist candidate starts to be given immense free coverage. 
The tone of the coverage, whether sympathetic or condemning, is not important, 
for the public becomes familiarized with the populist rhetoric regardless. In an 
air of boredom with the status quo politics, the novelty and drama of the populist 
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is once again sensationalized to normalcy and legitimacy. The third phase, the 
established phase, occurs after this legitimacy is achieved and the media begins 
to downplay the significance of a candidate and views him as not a threat. Finally, 
if applicable, is the decline phase, which would be the loss of coverage for the 
individual and party (2003, pp. 219-24).
The pattern for populist movements is established and with the integration of 
social media into campaigning, a new era must be understood. The desires of eli-
gible voters can now be appealed to directly without the traditional middle-man of 
radio, TV, and written press. Also, the ground-laying phase from before can now be 
produced from both the tools of social media and the users themselves. Populism 
has quickly entered a new age and my thoughts are that social media will begin and 
continue to produce populist movements and better enable their success compared to 
earlier in the century before social media.
3.  Defining social media and personalization
Now that the use of populism is explained, the role of social media is next. More 
specifically, the sociological phenomena stemming from the usage of social me-
dia is detailed through the spreading of information and forming of opinions. 
Could a possible uniqueness borne to 21st century instances of populisms be 
correlated to a “breeding ground” for populist movements among social media 
and similar platforms? Ideas including group polarizations, “cyber” cascades, 
online ideological targeting, and the force of false or misleading information 
could be associated with methods to power plausibly utilized by a new contempo- 
rary populist incarnation.
Overall, being that this century has so far been characterized as operating funda-
mentally around the use of the internet, my discussion of social media will refer to 
various online platforms and the traffic therein. Search engines, media and news plat-
forms, etc. may be mentioned, but for this paper I cover the “social media” tools that 
accrue the persistent attention of many. This “social media” refers to “Internet-based 
platforms that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content, usually 
using either mobile or web-based technologies”, as defined by Helen Margetts et al. 
(2015, p. 5), in Political Turbulence: How Social Media Shape Collective Action (as 
cited in Sunstein, 2017, p. 22). It would especially incorporate major platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter, but also Instagram and Snapchat, and to an extent sites like 
YouTube, blogs, and forums. In essence, I am referring to any hosting service that 
allows opinion to be formed and shared, information to be spread, and audiences to 
be reached. An explanation is needed as to why these new information tools could 
have (or have had) a skewing effect on democratic participation regarding ideologi-
cal positioning and self-informing.
In this new millennium, previous sociological patterns may have precedent 
but as society reforms, so must the methods of acquiring and giving knowledge 
and power. Previously, one’s architecture of control over forming a worldview 
was based in a public sphere. One of course had presuppositions and biases but 
would nonetheless encounter opposing views regularly among that which was 
sought out (Sunstein, 2017, pp. 1-6). This was due in part to the unique passage 
of information solely through reputable and/or established general-interest in-
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termediaries – newspapers, magazines, TV, and radio broadcasters. These third 
parties have been subdued by the special-interest intermediaries of private social 
networking applications, the “social media” (pp. 18-20). So now the traditional 
news mediums are often accessed through another online medium; this online 
medium being both curtailed by the respective owners and administrators but 
also through the “personalization” of the user himself.
To explain this medium “personalization”, I introduce the idea of the “Dai-
lyMe”, as used by Cass Sunstein in his #Republic (2017). Through the active 
sorting and segregation of posts by the user himself and the built-in algorithm of 
the platform to adjust the feed according to the user’s behaviors, this user effec-
tively is created an echo chamber of self-confirming and targeted information, 
removing many opposing posts that one could otherwise encounter. In addition 
to the influence users themselves have, is the ability to be ideologically targeted 
in this domain. As previously mentioned, the built-in algorithms monitor the 
“clicking behavior” of users in order to select posts more likely to be interacted 
with and make new suggestions in a similar fashion. Along those lines, with 
targeted articles of information can come targeted political advertisements. The 
online medium, the “DailyMe”, we create for ourselves should be quite capa-
ble of presenting to a certain ideologically aligned individual with a compatible 
message from a political figure or organization.
Also from #Republic, according to a 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center, con-
sumption of current events, politics, etc. has been relocating to this personalized 
online sphere for a significant percentage of the population: with 59% of US adults 
getting this information from Twitter and 66% from Facebook (from the same poll, 
67% of US adults use Facebook, so possibly 44% of the population is using Face-
book explicitly for this purpose) (2016, p. 126). This shift from direct access of gen-
eral-interest intermediaries to personalized special-interest screens could be claimed 
to be producing ideological polarization and informational isolation among partici-
pating parties.
Now, supposing the above claim to be true, my proposition is one of whether 
this effect could relate to a rise of populist tendencies. For if a polarized group 
discussing in an echo chamber could cause a tide of misinformation or emotional 
unrest with just enough influence to upset a status quo, it could be a step. A false 
misleading, or propagandized post circulating in a certain network managing to 
gain momentum through an informational cascade, without need for verification 
by exposed consumers, could completely change the political atmosphere among 
a group. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) detail four potential social costs of the con-
sumption of this misinformation. First, mistaken consumers would fare for the 
worse due to having less-accurate beliefs. Moreover, these less-accurate beliefs may 
“…reduce positive social externalities, undermining the ability of the democratic 
process to elect high-quality candidates” (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, 
p. 219). In addition, these false or misleading news pieces could cause consumers 
to become even more skeptical of legitimate sources, blurring the lines between 
the real and the fake. Later on, these social results may initiate lacks of demand 
on the consumer’s part and initiative of an established source’s part for reporting 
that is unbiased, accurate, and reliable. These costs could only perpetuate the 
tendencies of polarization and psychological malaise and uncertainty, plausible 
ingredients for a populist catch-hold. 
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4.  Analyzing US Presidential campaigns incorporating social media
The respective campaign methodologies from the 2016 US presidential election 
should be viewed in a context of constructed reaction and result from the 2008 
and 2012 presidential campaigns. So as these two prior election seasons, 2016 
saw social media as an additional requisite for reaching the electorate. However, 
while social media maintained, perhaps even increased, its quantitative presence, 
the quality of and manner of participation in its political usage undoubtedly had 
undergone a negative shift. Since 2008, the efforts by President Obama, and his 
opponents during his tenure, to shape this qualitative aspect of social media in 
politics laid the groundwork for President Trump’s online success, in turn setting a 
new precedent for future populist politics.
To explain this qualitative shift in social media usage, I take from Jody C. 
Baumgartner and Terri L. Towner’s (2017, p. 156) The Internet and the 2016 
Presidential Campaign. In this, the use of social media during campaigns is concep-
tualized along a continuum of user threshold levels. These levels being: 1) campaign 
engagement (high threshold); 2) interactive expression (medium threshold); and 3) 
information seeking (low threshold). The general trend has been from a high thresh-
old in 2008, to a medium threshold in 2012, and finally a low threshold in 2016. 
Through a combination of lessening enthusiasm for candidates and the candidates 
themselves exerting greater control over narrative and online voter engagement, the 
dynamic of popular mobilization on social media is a shift from active discourse to 
passive consumption of political information (2017, pp. 157, 172).
To quote Baumgartner & Towner, “[in 2008] …voters actively engaged social 
media outside the context of formal campaign and party organizations” (2017, 
p. 153). They created their own content promoting a candidate to be shared and 
gathered campaign involvement from friends through their own social networks. 
Entering 2012, the public displayed less innovation and engagement on social media 
while the campaigns increasingly developed new strategies to exert greater control 
over narrative and voters’ online engagement. Essentially, social media had become 
“a new form of passing entertainment” (2017, p. 154). By the 2016 campaign, can-
didates were prone to “[flood] the social media zone with their own content, eclips-
ing the ability of voter-generated material to gain traction”. Campaigns would “…
actively seek to coordinate social media users’ political engagement through their 
organizations rather than having users take the initiative, as occurred in 2008”. All 
the while “…voters were less likely to create and disseminate their own material as 
they were more inclined to monitor social media without comment or to respond to 
material posted by campaign and media elites” (2017, pp. 153-55, 172).
This rising passivity in conjunction with the recent allocation of political infor-
mation gathering from traditional mediums to the personalized online could be inter-
preted as detrimentally affecting eligible voters’ political information efficacy, which 
is “…the extent to which individuals believe they have the information necessary to 
meaningfully engage in political participation” (Schill & Hendricks, 2018, p. 109). 
This ties in with Allcott and Gentzkow’s (2017) premise of social costs of misinfor-
mation. In addition, the brevity, negativity, personal or character focus, and “going 
public” aspects of the most recent social media campaign use are exploitative of 
this political information efficacy, all serving as archetypal methods of a populist 
environment.
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The brevity feature of the 2016 US presidential election is not new, starting even 
before the Obama campaigns. Due to the twenty-four/seven mass media news cy-
cles, brief sound bites became the more familiar presentations of politicians. Now, 
with the introduction of social media, especially twitter, compact messaging became 
an important political tool in and of itself; while not necessarily a significantly novel 
method of campaigning, the fact that this is occurring on social media without ini-
tial collaboration with traditional media is what is most important here. Twitter al-
lows for, not exhaustively, brief campaign or poll updates, re-tweetable slogans such 
as “Hope and Change” or “Make America Great Again”, and especially recently, 
rapid-fire insults and attacks that can help shape public opinion and policy (Farnsworth, 
2018, p. 7). These simple and often-times emotional messages effortlessly grab the atten-
tion of an easily distracted populous due to their entertainment value. In addition, there is 
a lessened degree of mediation with these new “sound-bites” being sent on social media 
and a much larger audience, with campaign tweets themselves also become news in mass 
media, again helping candidates shape public narrative.
An unfortunate tendency of a tweet’s brevity is the ease of turning negative. The 
“rapid-fire insults” mentioned before are evidenced by President Trump’s use of 
twitter as a bully-pulpit. Outside the deliberate cynicism from candidates is also 
evident among online users themselves, especially in ideologically isolated rooms. 
An example: 
[A] study of 39 million political comments on Reddit from January 2015 to Jan-
uary 2017 found that an increasing number of offensive posts that focused on 
political content appeared leading up to the 2016 election, a trend not seen in non-
political posts from the same period. Those offensive posts… were also more pop-
ular on the site (as measured by up-votes minus down-votes by those reacting to 
the posts) than comments that were not deemed offensive. … Rewarded behavior 
is repeated behavior, and so the forwarding of nasty comments online should lead 
to even more such commentary on social media (Farnsworth, 2018, pp. 135-36).
Recall Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield’s (2003, p. 219) first step of populist 
mobilization, the “indirect increase of society’s sense of psychological insecurities”; 
the political cynicism and character negativity online which caught and flourished 
among the right during Obama’s campaigns and tenure possibly enabled this practice 
under Trump towards a conservative populist electoral success.
Maintaining a positive personality and character appearance is also an important 
tool in contemporary campaigning. President Obama utilized social media to this end 
to project himself as both the messenger calling for ‘hope and change’ and the per-
sonification of that mantra. He would regularly post instances of his appearance on 
non-politically oriented programs showcasing a friendly and empathetic demeanor 
or even a “regular-ness” such as showcasing his college basketball tournament picks. 
For more policy specific exercises, the Obama campaigns were keen on reaching out 
to the public to explain policy challenges and initiatives through the additional use 
of YouTube videos and online peer-to-peer communication efforts, all emphasizing 
Obama’s personal qualities (Farnsworth, 2018, p. 6).
In comparison, the Trump campaign especially focused on signs of adoration, 
combining images of rallying supporters (and hyperbolic rhetoric to over quan-
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tify the extent of this) and for example, an image of President Trump addressing 
a joint session of Congress, with Vice President Pence and House Speaker Ryan 
standing and applauding the new president, on his White House page once in office 
(Farnsworth, 2018, pp. 131-33). In addition, his colloquial social media messages 
left voters with the impression that he was speaking directly to them. Moreover, can-
didate Trump would “go public”, a two-step plan involving generating controversy 
and then attacking journalists, the media as a whole, and fact checkers, cementing a 
personification as the only one who could be trusted (Baumgartner & Towner, 2017, 
p. 200). 
In summary of these social media techniques, “… posts were ‘social-media-genic’ 
and designed to be shared, clicked, and commented upon” (Schill & Hendricks, 
2018, p. 21). Through brevity and a focus on the personal, populist candidates easily 
provide the passing entertainment needed to gather a following in today’s politi-
cal arena. Further, incivility and the enablement of passivity online proved to be 
a successful method for right-wing populism whereas active engagement is more 
effective for those leaning left. These propositions were given credence in a research 
study by Jacob Groshek and Karolina Koc-Michalska (2017), in “Helping populism 
win? Social media use, filter bubbles, and support for populist presidential candi-
dates in the 2016 US election campaign”.
5.  Concluding remarks
Twenty-first century populisms are unique in that they utilize social media in mobili-
zation. While traditional forms of media are of course not irrelevant, the introduction 
of this new “personalized” medium may present a new era of politics, especially in 
the context of the US presidential campaign. As this phenomenon is contemporary, 
future analytical literatures will be necessary to better understand these developing 
events. In addition, as this article takes from a study on the use of social media from 
2008-2016, it will be interesting to analyze how those trends continue to develop. 
Comparatively, while the claim here is only relevant to election of the US President, 
it may not be implausible to draw a connection between the rise of populist leaders 
on the world scale and the use of social media in other countries.
Reflecting, it should be noted that this article does not aim to explain how to 
address the “problem” of populist enablement, nor if it even is a “problem;” rather, 
what is important is the establishment that social media provides a connection be-
tween US presidential campaigns and twenty-first century populism. The most sig-
nificant here is the amendment of Mazzoleni, Stewart, and Horsfield’s description of 
populist mobilization to include social media and bring to attention the need to better 
understand the implications of social media on the four phases, for which more re-
search will be necessary.
One example is whether this introduction of social media diminishes expectation 
during the final two phases. Due to online usage’s seeming expedition and facilita-
tion of a populist in the first two, it may become possible to never reach the decline 
phase but stay in the established. Moreover, entering that established phase may 
also have new significance via achieving legitimacy but being able to carry-over 
and maintain the spectacle in perpetuum. Another is extending a “pseudo” campaign 
once elected through the populist’s tenure; social media would allow eligible voters 
9Julian Hendrix, G. Teknokultura 16(1) 2019: 1-10
to be subjugated to the anxieties brought by the ground-laying and insurgent phases 
continuously to the official re-election campaign.
Further, social media enables twenty-first century populisms in that emotional 
biases are triggered towards the benefit of leaders. It adds a characteristic of och-
locracy with heightening outrage from viral posts and videos into uncivil discourse 
against private individuals, citizen or official, incorporating harassment and a dis-
tancing response from private enterprises. While populist candidates are indeed as-
sisted in garnering attention and setting a narrative by social media, the participatory 
function of the population cannot be understated either.
Finally, the conjunction of social media and politics may have completely rede-
fined the role of the citizen. During these past, and probable future, instances of con-
temporary populisms, political information has been commodified by social media. 
In other words, populism and social media now creates the political to be consumed. 
The reach of the political sphere has been expanded by social media to define a per-
son’s subjectivity. This political subjectivity is becoming a commodity through the 
consumption of yourself by oneself online – the endpoint of the “DailyMe”.
The majority of people’s opinions were kept to themselves before but are now 
shown externally through “likes” and sharing of posts. Modern political parties 
sustain their followings online through the use of hashtags and individual politi-
cians now gain or lose favor through his or her online performance. The developing 
self-categorizing and passive-consumptive trends in the online sphere are signifi-
cantly affecting the way eligible voters prepare themselves to enact a properly in-
formed participation in elections. Developing during the Obama era a decade ago 
to now the surprise Trump election results, the political spectacle on social media is 
undoubtedly a powerful force in modern day populisms. 
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